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I. THE DEATH PENALTY IN TEXAS
It feels as though local Texas news is constantly reporting on a new death
sentence being handed down, an execution that has taken place, or a death
row inmate fighting for his life. Over the course of a month in the fall of
2017, six death row inmates were the focus of reporting by major Texas
media outlets.1 Why does Texas embrace capital punishment so strongly?
In 1972, the Supreme Court issued an opinion that effectively put a halt

1. See generally Keri Blakinger, Judge Sets Execution Date for Sugar Land Man Who Had Family
Killed for $1 Million Inheritance, HOUS. CHRON. (Nov. 7, 2017, 11:20 AM), http://www.chron.com/
news/houston-texas/article/Judge-sets-execution-date-for-Sugar-Land-man-12336728.php [perma.
cc/JV6H-99WU] (covering the setting of an execution date for a Fort Bend County murder); Jolie
McCullough, Houston Serial Killer Faces Execution This Week, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2017, 12:00 AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10/17/houston-serial-killer-faces-execution-week/ [perma.cc/
NCL5-E3X8] (describing a Texas serial killer’s crimes and announcing his date of execution); Jolie
McCullough, Texas Executes Mexican National Despite International Ire, TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 8, 2017,
11:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/11/08/planned-execution-mexican-national-drawsinternational-ire/ [perma.cc/E6VX-9AAM] (reporting on the execution of a Mexican national in
Huntsville on November 8, 2017); Jolie McCullough, Texas Executes Robert Pruett, Who Insisted on
Innocence in Prison Guard’s Murder, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 12, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2017/10/12/texas-executes-robert-pruett-who-insisted-innocence-prison-guards-murd/ [perma.cc/
3XVB-F25G] (providing an account of an execution that took place on October 12, 2017);
San Antonio Man Set for March Execution for Lubbock Slaying, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://apnews.com/ba017961e9644857a5c9b16037d6e50a
[https://perma.cc/YP3C-5T53]
(announcing an execution date for a Texas inmate); Stephen Young, Dallas Child Killer
John Battaglia’s Execution Set—For the Third Time, DALL. OBSERVER (Nov. 2, 2017, 4:00 AM),
http://www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-killer-john-battaglia-set-to-die-feb-1-10029868 [perma.
cc/L93B-H3HS] (noting the execution date of a Texas inmate for February of 2018).
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on all executions nationwide.2 This moratorium lasted until 1976 when the
Court ruled a death sentence can be constitutional if the procedure with
which it was obtained was within the guidelines of the Court.3 Since then,
Texas has repeatedly led the nation in the number of executions carried out
each year.4 Of the 1,465 executions in the United States since 1976, Texas
is responsible for 545, nearly five times as many as the next leading state.5
II. FRAMING THE ISSUE: THE SUPREME COURT’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE
GUIDANCE TO THE STATES TO DETERMINE INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
In recent years, the nation’s growing disapproval of the death penalty can
be seen through Supreme Court opinions narrowing the scope of capital
punishment,6 a number of states abolishing the practice,7 decreased number
2. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (determining
the way in which the presented death sentences were arbitrarily obtained constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, essentially creating a moratorium on the death penalty in the United States).
3. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191–92 (1976) (ruling not all death sentences are
unconstitutional as long as they follow the guidelines set out by the court, including a bifurcated trial
and sufficient jury instructions).
4. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2016: YEAR END REPORT 2
(2016), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2016YrEnd.pdf [http://perma.cc/VY3H-WUBU]
(providing basic facts about the death penalty in the United States, including number of executions,
races of executed offenders, and number of exonerations by state); David Von Drehle, Bungled
Executions. Backlogged Courts. And Three More Reasons the Modern Death Penalty is a Failed Experiment, TIME,
June 8, 2015, at 26, 28 (“Even in Texas, which leads the nation in executions since 1976[,] . . . the
wheels are coming off the bandwagon.”). But see Jolie McCullough, In an Unusual Year, Texas Didn’t
Lead the Nation in Executions, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 15, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/
2016/12/15/unusual-year-death-penalty-texas-didnt-have-most-e/
[perma.cc/HZC5-GCP5]
(“Texas—the state that has executed the most people by far since the death penalty was reinstated in
the United States [forty] years ago—had the nation’s second-busiest death chamber this year for the
first time since 2001. Georgia’s nine executions in 2016 surpassed the Lone Star State’s record-low
number of seven.”).
5. See Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [perma.cc/XDR6-XLXN] (showing the
number of executions in Texas since 1976 was 545, with the next leading state, Virginia, at 113 total
executions).
6. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315–16 (2002) (detailing the change in the country’s
attitude since the Court’s Penry decision, which upheld the death penalty for intellectually disabled,
apparent through a number of states enacting statutes explicitly prohibiting execution of intellectually
disabled in response to the Penry opinion). See generally Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008)
(declaring the death penalty an unconstitutional punishment for the rape of a child where the child did
not die and the offender did not intend to cause death to the child); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578–79 (2005) (abrogating the death penalty for defendants under the age of eighteen at the time the
offense was committed).
7. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, since 2007, seven states—
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York—have abolished
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of executions,8 and the number of death sentences imposed.9 In 2002, the
Supreme Court opined Atkins v. Virginia,10 their first opinion categorically
prohibiting the death penalty in relation to intellectually disabled
offenders.11 Atkins and co-defendant, Jones, kidnapped Eric Nesbitt,
robbed him, drove him to an ATM to withdraw more money, then drove
him to a final location where they proceeded to shoot Mr. Nesbitt eight
times, killing him.12 Ultimately, the Virginia state court sentenced Atkins
to death despite testimony by a forensic psychologist that Atkins was
“mildly mentally retarded.”13 Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
analyzed Atkins’ claim under the Eighth Amendment.14 Justice Stevens’
the death penalty. States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 9,
2016), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [perma.cc/5DCP-WDXX].
Three additional states—Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Washington—have gubernatorial moratoria in
place. Id.
8. “Executions continued their historic decline in 2016, with [twenty] executions carried out by
just five states. It was the fewest number of executions in the [United States] since 1991 and the fewest
number of states carrying them out since 1983.” DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 4, at 5.
9. According to the Death Penalty Information Center,
Fewer death sentences will be imposed in 2016 than in any other year since the Supreme Court
declared [United States] death penalty statutes unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia in 1972. . . .
The [thirty] death sentences expected to be imposed in 2016 represent a [thirty-nine percent]
decline from last year’s [forty-two]-year low, and are down more than [ninety percent] from the
315 death sentences imposed during the peak death-sentencing year of 1996.
See id. at 3 (highlighting the changes in the death penalty in the year 2016); see also Drehle, supra note 4,
at 27 (explaining several reasons why the United States has seen a decline in the death penalty); Jeffrey
M. Jones, U.S. Death Penalty Support Lowest Since 1972, GALLUP NEWS (Oct. 26, 2017),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/221030/death-penalty-support-lowest-1972.aspx
[perma.cc/8KBR3W6M] (“Americans’ support for the death penalty has dipped to a level not seen in [forty-five] years.
Currently, [fifty-five percent] of [United States] adults say they favor the death penalty for convicted
murderers.”).
10. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
11. See id. at 320–21 (holding a death penalty sentence would violate the Eighth Amendment as
applied to intellectually disabled criminals).
12. Id. at 307.
13. Id. at 308–09. The term “mentally retarded” is quoted in some materials included in this
comment because that was the medically acceptable term at the time it was used. Now, however, the
accepted term is “intellectually disabled.” See Use of Mental Retardation on this Website, AM. ASS’N ON
INTELL. & DEV. DISABILITIES, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/historical-context [perma.cc/
938U-CDW6] (explaining that while the term used to define intellectual disability has changed, the
essential elements in a diagnosis have not); see also Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643
(2010) (changing the term “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability” in all federal laws).
14. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII)); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment).
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majority opinion makes clear that execution of the intellectually disabled
does not further any policy purposes for which capital punishment was
intended.15 As the Court states, the difficulty lies in determining whether
an individual qualifies as intellectually disabled for purposes of removing the
death penalty as a possible punishment.16 However, instead of providing
guidance on how to answer the more difficult question, the Court side-steps
the issue and simply states: “[W]ith regard to insanity, ‘we leave to the
State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional
restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.’”17 The only direction
provided by the Court was that intellectual disability had to be a clinically
defined disorder “requir[ing] not only subaverage intellectual functioning,
but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, selfcare, and self-direction that became manifest before age [eighteen].”18 The
states were then entrusted with the task of determining the appropriate
methods in order to arrive at the clinical definition.19 While, theoretically,
the Atkins ruling was a step in the right direction for opponents of capital
punishment, the Court’s declination to establish guidelines and allowing the
states to enact their own procedures on how to determine intellectual
disability for purposes of removing the death penalty led to difficulty in the
implementation of the ruling.20 As a result, states have adopted varying
15. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (“We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded
criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty.”).
16. Id. at 317.
17. Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416–17 (1986)).
18. Id. at 318. See generally Timothy R. Saviello, The Appropriate Standard of Proof for Determining
Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases: How High Is Too High, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 163, 174–78 (2015)
(expounding on the Atkins Court’s failure to provide any guidance on how to comply with its ruling).
19. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (leaving the task of developing appropriate procedure to deal
with this issue to the states).
20. See John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson & Christopher Seeds, Of Atkins and Men: Deviations
from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 689,
689 (2009) (addressing the shortfalls of the Atkins ruling, including the effects stereotypes have had on
improperly excluding some individuals from the Atkins exemption); Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge
of Implementing Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and
Adjudications of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 811-18 (2007)
(recognizing the difficulties states have in implementing the ruling of Atkins and proposing methods
states could use to cohesively define intellectual disability); Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A
Psychiatric Can of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255, 256 (2003) (“In contrast to the overarching aim of the
majority’s opinion in Atkins—making the administration of capital punishment more equitable—the
Supreme Court’s latest prescription of psychiatric help may only add a new layer of complexity and
confusion to the already capricious process through which the [United States] criminal justice system
imposes death sentences.”); Natalie A. Pifer, The Scientific and the Social in Implementing Atkins v. Virginia,
41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1036, 1037–38 (2016) (exploring the difficulty the Atkins ruling presents to
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methods of determining intellectual disability resulting in “state capital
systems that are worlds apart.”21 In the years following the Atkins ruling,
trial-and-error was obvious: states would enact a statute22 and construe the
statute through case law,23 which would subsequently be overruled by the
Supreme Court.24

courts in navigating the social and scientific aspects of intellectual disability); Peggy M. Tobolowsky,
Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders And Excluding Them From Execution, 30 J. LEGIS.
77, 77–78 (2003) (expounding on the different ways in which states define mental retardation and the
way in which it effects the procedures they impose for determining which offenders to exclude from
capital punishment).
21. Deborah W. Denno, Courting Abolition, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1827, 1836 (2017) (reviewing
CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT); see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A (West 2017) (defining intellectual disability as
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is accompanied by significant limitations
in adaptive functioning in at least two . . . of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home
living, social or interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic
skills, work, leisure, health and safety.”); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1 (2017) (outlining
Louisiana’s procedure for determining intellectual disability and characterizing the disability as a
combination of intellectual and adaptive deficits which manifested during the individual’s
developmental period); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-101 (West 2017) (outlawing imposition of a death
sentence on an individual with “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that exists
concurrently with significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning” and the limited functioning has
presented itself prior to age twenty-two); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (West 2017) (characterizing
intellectual disability as a combination of limited intellectual functioning as determined by current
psychological exams and deficits in adaptive behavior presented before the age of eighteen), declared
unconstitutional by Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); see also States That Have Changed Their Statutes to
Comply With the Supreme Court’s Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-have-changed-their-statutes-comply-supreme-courts-decisionatkins-v-virginia [perma.cc/3P5H-DTKW] (detailing the differing methods some states have
formulated to evaluate claims of intellectual disability in response to the Atkins ruling).
22. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (West 2013) (codifying Florida’s method to determine
intellectual disability for purposes of abrogating the death penalty), declared unconstitutional by Hall v.
Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
23. See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712 (Fla. 2007) (construing FLA. STAT. § 921.137 as
establishing a bright-line cut off for intellectual disability at an intelligence quotient of seventy), abrogated
by Hall, 572 U.S. 701; Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704, 708–10 (Fla. 2012) (affirming the statutory
construction from Cherry), rev’d, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004) (creating seven common law factors to determine intellectual disability for purpose of
abrogating the death penalty because Texas lawmakers had failed to enact a statutory method), abrogated
by Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
24. See generally Moore, 137 S. Ct at 1052–53 (rejecting Texas’ attempt to comply with Atkins and
the Briseno factors as unconstitutional because of the high risk they create of executing an offender with
an intellectual disability); Hall, 572 U.S. at 723–24 (striking down Florida’s statute defining intellectual
disability enacted for the purposes of complying with Atkins v. Virginia).
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A. Hall v. Florida: Florida’s Attempt at Atkins Compliance
The state most notably attempting to comply with the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Atkins was Florida.25 Florida enacted a pre-Atkins statute
prohibiting a penalty of death on an intellectually disabled defendant.26 In
Cherry v. State,27 the Florida Supreme Court construed the three prong
statute to establish a bright-line cut off for establishing an intellectual
disability at an intelligence quotient (IQ) of seventy.28 If the defendant
failed to satisfy the first prong by proving an IQ of seventy, they were barred
from presenting evidence of the second and third prong.29 Florida believed
the imposition of a strict cutoff satisfied the statutory definition of
“significant subaverage general intellectual functioning.”30 The seemingly
arbitrary score of seventy was arrived at by interpreting “subaverage general
intellectual functioning” as two standard deviations below the average IQ
score of 100.31 The Supreme Court admits that Florida is not precluded
from including standard deviations in their calculations.32 However, a
serious problem arises when a strict cutoff is construed—the defendant is
precluded from presenting any other mitigating evidence of his disability.33
As a result, in Cherry, a death sentence was upheld for a defendant because
25. See Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 714 (construing section § 921.137 of the Florida Statute as
establishing a bright-line cut off for intellectual disability at an IQ of seventy). Two other states also
enacted a post-Atkins statute with a strict IQ cutoff at seventy: Delaware and Virginia. Hall, 572 U.S.
at 717.
26. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137 (defining intellectual disability as: “significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested
during the period from conception to age [eighteen]. The term ‘significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning,’ for the purpose of this section, means performance that is two or more
standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of
the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. The term ‘adaptive behavior,’ for the purpose of this
definition, means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal
independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community. The
Agency for Persons with Disabilities shall adopt rules to specify the standardized intelligence tests as
provided in this subsection”).
27. Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007).
28. Id. at 712–13.
29. See id. at 714 (“Because we find that Cherry does not meet the first prong of the
section 921.137(1) criteria, we do not consider the two other prongs of the mental retardation
determination.”).
30. See id. at 712–13 (explaining the plain language of the statute supported the court’s finding
of a strict IQ cutoff).
31. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 711–12 (2014) (citing FLA STAT. ANN. § 921.137(1)).
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 714 (ruling an offender with an IQ of seventy-two failed to
meet the state’s definition of intellectually disabled and thus was eligible for the death penalty).
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he had an IQ of seventy-two and was consequently barred from presenting
other evidence of disability.34
A similar result was reached in Hall v. State,35 where the death sentence
of an offender was upheld based on his IQ scores ranging between
sixty-seven and seventy-five,36 and the court’s subsequent refusal to admit
other evidence of his intellectual disability, including a doctor’s report
determining his IQ score to be sixty-nine.37 Because the Supreme Court
considered this to be unacceptable, it granted certiorari to review Hall’s
sentence and Florida’s method.38 Ultimately the Court ruled the Florida
method failed to meet current medical standards because it viewed an IQ
score as conclusive evidence of intellectual disability, or lack thereof, and
refused to take into consideration the factors experts would consider when
making a diagnosis.39 For example, medical professionals decline to
consider the IQ score as conclusive evidence because many factors
contribute to fluctuating scores.40 In essence, the Supreme Court took the
opportunity in Hall v. Florida,41 to narrow the broad ruling of Atkins.42 The
Court highlights the importance in relying on medical professionals and
experts when seeking a diagnosis of intellectual disability.43 The Supreme
Court is explicit in Hall that current medical standards should be relied on
and a myriad of factors should be considered when determining whether an
34. See Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 712–14 (refusing to consider evidence introduced by offender to
satisfy the second and third prongs of section 921.137 of the Florida Statute because he failed to satisfy
the first prong by proving his IQ is seventy or below).
35. See Hall v. State, 109 So. 3d 704 (Fla. 2012) (affirming the statutory construction from
Cherry), rev’d, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014).
36. See id. at 706 (“While there is no doubt that [Hall] has serious mental difficulties, is probably
somewhat retarded, and certainly has learning difficulties and a speech impediment, the Court finds
that [Hall] was competent at the resentencing hearings.” (quoting Hall v. State, 742 So. 2d 255, 229
(Fla. 1999))).
37. Id. at 710.
38. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 704 (“This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates an unacceptable risk
that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional.”).
39. Id. at 712–16.
40. See id. (describing how medical professionals use many factors to determine intellectual
disability).
41. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
42. See James W. Ellis, Hall v. Florida: The Supreme Court’s Guidance in Implementing Atkins, 23 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 383, 390 (2014) (“One clear message is that the states are not free to define
intellectual disability in any way they choose but must act consistently with the consensus of
professionals in the field.”).
43. See, e.g., Hall, 572 U.S. at 710 (“In determining who qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is
proper to consult the medical community’s opinions.”).
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offender has an intellectual disability.44 This focus “calls into question the
approach by a few courts that rest heavily on stereotypes about people with
intellectual disability rather than on the scientific knowledge and experience
accumulated by professionals in the field[,]”45 including the post-Atkins
approach developed by Texas: the Briseno Factors.46
B. Ex Parte Briseno: Texas Responds to Atkins
As Atkins ascended to the Supreme Court, Jose Garcia Briseno awaited
execution on Texas’s death row after being convicted and sentenced to
death for the robbing and murdering of a Texas sheriff in his home in
1991.47 Briseno filed multiple state and federal appeals, all of which were
denied, and he was scheduled to be executed.48 The Supreme Court issued
their Atkins opinion on June 20, 2002 and Briseno filed a writ of habeas
corpus with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) on July 10, 2002—
the same day he was scheduled to be executed.49 Briseno argued he was
“mentally retarded” and thus, ineligible for execution under Atkins.50 The
CCA stayed his execution and ordered the original trial court to hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Briseno was in fact intellectually
disabled under the Atkins standard.51 The habeas court ultimately found
he did not qualify as intellectually disabled under Atkins and upheld his
death sentence.52
In their opinion affirming the trial court’s death sentence, the CCA
acknowledged that it is the job of the Texas Legislature, not theirs, to create
44. Id.; see also Ellis, supra note 42, at 390–91 (“[T]he Court’s emphasis on scientific and clinical
understanding of intellectual disability calls into question the approach by a few courts that rest heavily
on stereotypes about people with intellectual disability rather than on the scientific knowledge and
experience accumulated by professionals in the field.”).
45. Ellis, supra note 42, at 390–91.
46. See Blume, Johnson & Seeds, supra note 20, at 702–03 (criticizing the methods utilized by
some states, including Texas, for including stereotypical factors in their definition of intellectual
disability); Mia-Carré B. Long, Of Mice and Men, Fairy Tales, and Legends: A Reactionary Ethical Proposal to
Storytelling and the Briseño Factors, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 859, 865 (2013) (connecting the Briseno
factors based on stereotypical attributes of an intellectually disabled individual, such as the character
Lennie from the popular novel Of Mice and Men).
47. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogated by Moore v. Texas,
137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

9

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 3, Art. 7

1038

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1029

laws.53 However, since the legislature failed to enact any post-Atkins54
statutes to comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling, and the CCA had been
inundated with habeas corpus applications in the two years following Atkins,
they created the law governing when an individual qualifies as intellectually
disabled for purposes of abrogating a death sentence: the Briseno factors.55
In developing these factors, the court states that medical professionals are
more likely to broadly define and diagnose intellectual disability, but they
must narrow that definition to only include individuals that the majority of
Texas residents would agree should be exempt from the death penalty,
individuals such as the character Lennie from Of Mice and Men.56 The CCA
applied the definition of “mental retardation” created by the American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR)57 and stated: “(1) ‘significantly
subaverage’ general intellectual functioning; (2) accompanied by ‘related’
limitations in adaptive functioning; (3) the onset of which occurs prior to
the age of [eighteen].”58 Because the court found the “adaptive behavior
criteria [to be] exceedingly subjective” they established seven nonclinical
factors they believe demonstrate intellectual disability:
•

Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—
his family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was
mentally retarded at that time, and, if so, act in accordance with that
determination?

53. Id. at 5.
54. The Texas Legislature had attempted to pass a pre-Atkins statute in 2001, house bill 236,
prohibiting the execution of the intellectually disabled defined as “significant subaverage general
intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the
developmental period.” Id. at 6. (quoting Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001)). The bill was vetoed
by then-Governor Rick Perry. See Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (proposing to prohibit
imposition of a death sentence on the intellectually disabled; vetoed by Governor); see also Persons with
Mental Retardation Act of Sept. 1, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 76, § 1, sec. 591.003(13), 1991 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. (amended 1993) (codified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 591.003(13)) (providing the
definition of “mental retardation” that was current at the time of the Briseno opinion).
55. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 5.
56. Id. at 6. See generally JOHN STEINBECK, OF MICE AND MEN (1937) (chronicling the story
of a stereotypically intellectually disabled man, Lennie).
57. In 2007, the AAMR formally changed its name to American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). Press Release, Am. Ass’n on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities, Mental Retardation is No More—New Name is Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities (Mar. 2, 2007) (on file with author).
58. Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 7 (footnotes omitted) (citing AAMR, MENTAL RETARDATION:
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEM OF SUPPORT 5 (9th ed. 1992)).
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•

Has the person formulated plans and carried them through or is his
conduct impulsive?

•

Does his conduct show leadership or does it show that he is led around
by others?

•

Is his conduct in response to external stimuli rational and appropriate,
regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?

•

Does he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written
questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject?

•

Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in his own or others’ interests?

•

Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital
offense did the commission of that offense require forethought,
planning, and complex execution of purpose?59

After considering facts such as Texas Department of Criminal Justice
officers’ testimony that Briseno seemed “normal” while in custody, none of
his juvenile records indicated any sign of intellectual disability, and that
Briseno’s testimony was coherent, the CCA upheld Briseno’s death
sentence.60
The Briseno factors were the law in Texas for thirteen years, though many
in the medical and legal communities questioned their grounds and
substance.61 However, consistent with the trial-and-error approach
59. Id. at 8–9.
60. Id. at 16–18. Following this opinion, Briseno filed another habeas corpus petition and the
CCA ordered a new punishment hearing based on an improper jury charge. See Ex parte Briseno, No.
AP-76132, 2010 WL 2332150, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 9, 2010) (not designated for publication)
(remanding for a new punishment hearing because the instruction given to the jury violated the Eighth
Amendment for failing to sufficiently apprise the jury of the lesser available punishments). After
negotiating a plea deal, Briseno’s death sentence was commuted to a life sentence. Diane Jennings,
Death Sentence of a Man Who Killed Sheriff Changed to Life, DALL. NEWS (May 2013),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2013/05/03/death-sentence-of-man-who-killed-sheriffchanged-to-life [perma.cc/2EX2-KLJT]; see also Offenders No Longer on Death Row, TEX. DEP’T. CRIM.
JUST. (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_offenders_no_longer_on_dr.html
[perma.cc/V7GH-SEAY] (listing “Jose Briseno” as “Sentence commuted to life, #1853416”).
61. See generally Blume, Johnson & Seeds, supra note 20, at 712 (criticizing the multiple ways in
which the Briseno factors deviate from the clinically accepted methods of diagnosing intellectual
disability); Hannah Brewer, Note, The Briseno Factors: How Literary Guidance Outsteps the Bounds of Atkins
in the Post-Hall Landscape, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 240, 241 (2017) (predicting the Briseno factors will be
ruled unconstitutional after Hall v. Florida because they “differ from the clinical definitions of adaptive
behavior deficits created by the same professional organizations whose opinions were relied on in
Hall”); Hensleigh Crowell, Note, The Writing Is on the Wall: How the Briseno Factors Create an Unacceptable
Risk of Executing Persons with Intellectual Disability, 94 TEX. L. REV. 743, 744 (2016) (analyzing the
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observed in the Florida courts, Texas’s attempt to comply with Atkins was
also held to “create an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual
disability will be executed.”62 Bobby Moore was convicted and sentenced
to death for the capital murder of a Houston store clerk during an attempted
robbery and, on appeal, sought to abrogate his sentence by arguing
intellectual disability.63 After multiple state and federal appeals, including a
grant of federal relief which only led to another affirmation of his sentence
by a state trial court, Moore was granted a hearing to present evidence of his
intellectual disability.64 The habeas court, choosing to adopt the current,
clinical definition of “intellectual disability,”65 as defined by the AAIDD,
instead of the Briseno factors, found Moore to qualify for an Atkins
exemption.66 However, the CCA disregarded the recommendation of the
habeas court, applied the Briseno factors, and denied relief.67 At the habeas
hearing, Moore presented strong evidence which the court relied on in
determining his intellectual disability including: testimony of friends, family
problems resulting from implementation of the Briseno factors); Long, supra note 46, at 859 (addressing
the fact that the Briseno factors were derived from stereotypical attributes of an intellectually disabled
individual, such as the character Lennie from the popular novel Of Mice and Men).
62. See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044, 1053 (2017) (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S.
701, 704 (2014)) (rejecting Texas’s application of the Briseno factors because of their reliance on
outdated medical guidelines, deviation from clinically accepted standards, and consideration of
stereotypical characteristics ).
63. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
64. Id.
65. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS: DSM-5 31 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5] (detailing current medical standards on
diagnosing intellectual disability); Definition of Intellectual Disability, AM. ASS’N ON INTELL. & DEV.
DISABILITIES, http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.WeuF-hNSxE4 [perma.cc/24HMMYYP] (providing the currently accepted definition of intellectual disability as “characterized by
significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, which covers many
everyday social and practical skills. This disability originates before the age of eighteen”). The Briseno
factors were based on the outdated “1992 (ninth) edition of the American Association on Mental
Retardation (AAMR) manual, predecessor to the current AAIDD-11 manual.” Moore, 137 S. Ct. at
1046 (citing Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). The habeas court adopted the
definition employed by the AAIDD, not the American Psychiatric Association (APA), which “omits
the requirement that an individual’s adaptive behavior deficits must be ‘related to’ significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.” GEORGE E. DIX & JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY, TEXAS
PRACTICE, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 49:35 (3d ed. Supp. 2017).
66. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 485.
67. See id. at 486–87 (“[T]he habeas court concluded that it should use the most current position,
as espoused by AAIDD, regarding the diagnosis of intellectual disability rather than the test we
established in Briseno. . . . The decision to modify the legal standard for intellectual disability in the
capital-sentencing context rests with this Court unless and until the Legislature acts . . . .” (citing
Ex parte Hearn, 310 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010))).
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and medical professionals, that Moore was unable to comprehend concepts
of days of the week or months of the year until after the age of thirteen, and
Moore’s inability to read and write which led to his dropping out of school
in the ninth grade and being forced to live on the street.68 Despite these
indications of an intellectual disability, the CCA, in their “glass half-full
perspective”69 was able to support a death sentence by shifting their focus
from Moore’s adaptive deficits to his adaptive strengths.70 For instance,
the court viewed Moore becoming homeless in order to avoid abuse at
home as a strength because it indicated “good survival skills.”71
Upon Moore’s petition and a plea by the medical, scientific, and legal
communities,72 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to evaluate whether
the Briseno framework is constitutional under the Eighth Amendment and
Atkins v. Virginia.73 For multiple reasons, the Court ultimately held the
Briseno factors unconstitutional for “creat[ing] an unacceptable risk that
persons with intellectual disabilit[ies] will be executed.”74 First, the Court
68. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045.
69. See Blume, Johnson & Seeds, supra note 20, at 710 (describing the perspective adopted by
the CCA in Ex parte Briseno as shifting the focus from limitations in adaptive behavior, as instructed by
the clinical standard, to strengths in adaptive behavior which can invalidate claims of intellectual
disability and increase the difficulty of establishing unvarying clinical definitions).
70. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047 (“The habeas court, the CCA concluded, had erred by
concentrating on Moore’s adaptive weaknesses.” (citing Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 489)).
71. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogated by Moore, 137 S. Ct.
1039.
72. See Brief for The American Ass’n on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) &
The Arc of the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29–30, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039
(No. 15-797), 2016 WL 4151447 [hereinafter AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner]
(arguing the Supreme Court should reverse the CCA sentence because the Briseno framework deviates
from the current, clinically accepted definition of intellectual disability); Brief for The American Bar
Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797), 2016 WL
4151449 (urging the Supreme Court to reverse the CCA judgment because the Briseno factors lack any
scientific or clinical basis); Brief for The American Civil Liberties Union & The ACLU of Texas as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797), 2016 WL 4151448
(advocating for the reversal of Moore’s sentence because the Briseno factors are under-inclusive and
based on stereotypes of intellectual disability); Brief for American Psychological Ass’n (APA) et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16–17, Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797), 2016 WL 4151451
[hereinafter APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner] (requesting the Court hold the Texas
method unconstitutional based on several ways in which it deviates from the methods accepted by
mental health professionals).
73. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048.
74. Id. at 1051 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014)); see Adam Liptak,
Texas Used Wrong Standard in Death Penalty Cases, Justices Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/us/politics/texas-death-penalty-supreme-court-ruling.html
[https://perma.cc/WS4C-ZF8M] (reporting Texas’s failure to stay current on medical standards). But
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reiterated their reasoning from Hall v. Florida that, although Atkins gave the
power to the states to develop an appropriate method for determining
intellectual disability, that power does not extend to a total disregard of the
current medical standards.75 As with any area of medical or scientific study,
greater knowledge and understanding is gained over time through research
and study by experts in the area.76 Texas’s use of the Briseno factors, based
on a 1992 definition of intellectual disability, disregards current medical
standards by failing to include the mental health advancements made in the
preceding fifteen years.77 The CCA’s refusal to comply is further evidenced
by their criticism of the habeas court for applying the current medical
standard instead of the Briseno factors.78 The most critical deviation was the
court’s shift in focus from Moore’s adaptive deficits to his adaptive
strengths, contrary to the focus utilized by medical professionals, which
allowed those strengths to counteract the weight of his deficits.79 The
AAIDD stresses the purpose of focusing solely on an individual’s deficits
and excluding any consideration of any strengths is to aid a professional in

see Emily Taft, Moore v. Texas: Balancing Medical Advancements with Judicial Stability, 12 DUKE J. CONST.
L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 115, 126 (2017) (presenting support for Texas and the Briseno factors and
explaining why the Supreme Court should have ruled them constitutional).
75. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048–49.
76. AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 27 (“As is the case in
other fields, clinical science advances with new discoveries and, more frequently, with refined
understanding of established principles. Our clinical understanding of intellectual disability is no
exception.”).
77. See id. at 28 (“[T]he larger constitutional issue presented by this case is the choice by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to ignore scientific principles altogether, even those that have been
clearly accepted and established for decades.”); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 72, at 15 (“Texas continues to rely on an outdated diagnostic manual from 1992. This reliance is
not justified by scientific or medical practice and risks the misdiagnosis of persons with intellectual
disability.” (citation omitted)); accord Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486–87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)
(acknowledging that, although medical standards have changed since Atkins and Briseno, the power to
determine intellectual disability for an Atkins claim rests with the CCA), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
78. See Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 486 (“The habeas judge therefore erred by disregarding
our case law and employing the definition of intellectual disability presently used by the AAIDD . . . .”).
79. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050. But see AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 72, at 14–17 (“The clinical definition of adaptive behavior has long focused exclusively on
adaptive deficits. . . . The clinician’s diagnostic focus does not—and cannot—involve any form of
‘balancing’ deficits against the abilities or strengths which the particular individual may also possess.”);
APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 13 (“[M]ental health professionals
agree that intellectual disability can and should be diagnosed where there are sufficient deficits in adaptive
functioning. That remains true even if the individual has relative strengths in other areas. The presence
of relative strengths in some spheres of behavior is not evidence that a person does not have intellectual
disability.”).
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diagnosing disability by showing whether the individual’s intellectual
deficiencies are accompanied by any functioning deficiencies.80 This shift
creates an unacceptable risk that individuals with a mild disability will not
be considered intellectually disabled for purposes of an Atkins claim in
Texas.81 Finally, the Court criticized Texas’s consideration of who a
majority of its citizens would consider to be intellectually disabled for
purposes of avoiding capital punishment when developing the Briseno
factors instead of developing scientifically or clinically-based factors.82 By
including citizens’ opinions, individuals with a mild intellectual disability
could face different treatment, and potentially even execution, by Texas than
they would by other states’ standards.83 As the Court emphasizes, an
individual with a mild disability is still clinically considered disabled and
“[s]tates may not execute anyone in the ‘entire category of [intellectually
disabled] offenders.’”84 Thus, based on the subjective nature of the Briseno
factors, and because they lack a basis in current clinical or medical standards,
the Court essentially strikes them down.85
However, amongst all their criticisms, nowhere did the Court provide
express guidance on how the states should correctly evaluate an Atkinsclaim.86 Texas is again stuck in the same trial-and-error method observed
80. AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 19.
81. The CCA appeared to realize the Briseno factors created such a risk for individuals with a
mild intellectual disability and thus stated their goal was to establish factors that would only exempt
individuals that the majority of Texas residents would deem exempt. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1,
6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); accord Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (“After observing that persons with ‘mild’
intellectual disability might be treated differently under clinical standards than under Texas’[s] capital
system, the CCA defined its objective as identifying the ‘consensus of Texas citizens’ on who ‘should
be exempted from the death penalty.’” (quoting Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6)).
82. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; see DIX & SCHMOLESKY, supra note 65, at § 49:35 (“The Court
noted that the constitutional prohibition against capital punishment for those with a sufficient
intellectual disability is not a matter for democratic vote but a protection based on a constitutional
protection that cannot be taken away by majoritarian prerogative.”).
83. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051.
84. Id. (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005)).
85. See id. at 1044, 1051–52 (“[T]he several factors Briseno set out as indicators of intellectual
disability are an invention of the CCA untied to any acknowledged source. Not aligned with the
medical community’s information, and drawing no strength from our precedent . . . .”); see also DIX &
SCHMOLESKY, supra note 65, at § 49:35 (“In light of the criticism of Briseno from both sides of the
Supreme Court in Moore, it seems certain that Briseno cannot remain the guidepost for establishing the
standards for Atkins immunity from the death penalty much longer in Texas.”).
86. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“A second problem with the Court’s
approach is the lack of guidance it offers to States seeking to enforce the holding of Atkins . . . . Neither
the Court’s articulation of this standard nor its application sheds any light on what it means.”); see also
Clinton M. Barker, Note, Substantial Guidance Without Substantive Guides: Resolving the Requirements of
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in the years immediately following the Atkins ruling: a state-developed
method to evaluate an intellectual disability claim is put into place, the
Supreme Court holds it unconstitutional but declines to outline a compliant
method, placing the state back where they started—attempting to develop
an Atkins-compliant method.
Without any guidelines from the Supreme Court, the Texas Legislature
should take it upon themselves to devise a constitutional method for trial
courts to utilize when presented with an Atkins claim.87 However, despite
multiple pleas from the CCA, the Texas Legislature has declined to take any
action in the fifteen years since Atkins.88 The CCA, whose job is to interpret
the law, is left in a difficult position—the same position they found
themselves when creating the Briseno factors.89 The CCA is continuously
presented with a high volume of habeas applications and under the maxim
of “justice delayed is justice denied,” the Court was forced to act and create
law where there was none.90 The Briseno factors were, thus, intended to be
merely temporary guidelines until the legislature acted.91 With the
abrogation of the Briseno factors and the legislature’s continued reluctance
to act, the Texas standard has been left in a legal flux.92 In light of the

Moore v. Texas and Hall v. Florida, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1036 (2017) (outlining the lack of guidance
provided by the Supreme Court in defining “intellectually disabled” in Atkins v. Virginia).
87. See Petetan v. State, No. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 915530, at *59 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2017)
(Alcala, J., dissenting) (“The best scenario, of course, would be for the Texas Legislature to formulate
a standard for deciding intellectual-disability determinations in the context of capital murder cases, as
long as it acted in accordance with Supreme Court precedent.”).
88. See Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“The decision to modify
the legal standard for intellectual disability in the capital-sentencing context rests with this Court unless
and until the Legislature acts, which we have repeatedly asked it to do.”), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017);
DIX & SCHMOLESKY, supra note 65, at § 49:35 (“The majority’s rejection of Briseno [in Moore] heightens
the need for the long-unheeded request of the Court of Criminal Appeals for legislative guidance in
this difficult area.”).
89. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“This Court does not, under
normal circumstances, create law. We interpret and apply the law as written by the Texas Legislature
or as announced by the United States Supreme Court.”), abrogated by Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039.
90. Id.
91. See Petetan, 2017 WL 915530, at *53 (Alcala, J., dissenting) (“In all fairness to the Briseno
Court, the standard announced in that case was intended to be a temporary solution until the
Legislature could act to implement a permanent standard, and it made its decision thirteen years ago.”).
92. See id. at *3–5, 22 (rejecting the court’s ruling upholding the death penalty while the Texas
standard to determine an “intellectual disability is in flux”); Tommy Witherspoon,
Court Affirms Conviction, Death Penalty for Petetan, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD (Mar. 8, 2017),
http://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/court-affirms-conviction-death-penalty-for-petet
an/article_1c0ded48-1f23-5ab7-9be5-cc4c4e4c3b52.html [perma.cc/WGX6-ADQ2] (“Judge Elsa
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number of habeas applications received constantly by the CCA and the
number of offenders sentenced to death each year in Texas,93 the state
needs the legislature to step-up and take on the arduous task of developing
an Atkins-compliant standard to evaluate claims of intellectual disability.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Moore has set the stage and provided a perfect
opportunity for them to do so.
III. WHAT NOW?: FACTORS THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE SHOULD
CONSIDER WHEN FORMULATING AN ATKINS-COMPLIANT METHOD
FOR EVALUATING CLAIMS OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
A. Abolishing the Death Penalty Is Not the Answer to the Texas Problem
Until the Supreme Court provides states with express guidelines on how
to determine when an offender is exempt from capital punishment, the
states will continue to grapple with this issue. However, opponents of the
death penalty believe the answer to be much simpler: abolition.94 While
abolishment would be an ideal scenario, until capital punishment is
abolished nationwide, it is unlikely the Texas Legislature would allow such
legislation to be enacted into law.95 Year after year, Texas politicians

Alcala dissented, saying she preferred not to rule on Petetan’s case while the Texas standard for
determining whether someone is intellectually disabled is in legal flux.”).
93. See Andrea Keilen & Maurie Levin, Moving Forward: A Map for Meaningful Habeas Reform in
Texas Capital Cases, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 224 (2007) (“Of the 411 initial habeas applications filed
during the combined period encompassed by the Lethal Indifference study and the current study
(September 1, 1995 through September 1, 2006) . . . . Article 11.071 fails to consistently fulfill its role
as the vital safety net protecting the innocent and undeserving from execution.”).
94. See William A. Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death Penalty, 55 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 797, 801–02 (1998) (reasoning abolition of the death penalty should be the goal of all
industrialized countries); see generally About Us, TEX. COAL. TO ABOLISH DEATH PENALTY,
http://tcadp.org/about/about-us/ [perma.cc/K9JV-FWT4] (characterizing TCADP as a “statewide
grassroots advocacy organization dedicated solely to ending the death penalty in Texas”); About Us,
TEX. MORATORIUM NETWORK, http://www.texasmoratorium.org/about-us [perma.cc/NE7ACW77] (describing the non-profit organization’s main goal of “mobilizing statewide support for a
moratorium on executions in Texas”).
95. See Kevin M. Barry, The Law of Abolition, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 525 (2017)
(delineating the nationwide decline of a death sentences and highlighting that the vast majority of
imposed sentences come from four southern states: Georgia, Florida, Missouri, and Texas); accord Lyn
Suzanne Entzeroth, The End of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and the American Death Penalty Regime in
the Twenty-First Century, 90 OR. L. REV. 797, 834 (2012) (“No state in the Deep South has abolished the
death penalty, and as demonstrated recently in Texas and Georgia, these states have no qualms about
carrying out executions.”).
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introduce legislation proposing to abolish the death penalty.96 As predicted,
the proposed bills fail to make it out of committee.97 In a more realistic
approach, some members of the Texas Legislature seek to introduce bills
that would not completely bar the state’s ability to employ capital
punishment, but would limit its implementation.98 These lawmakers,
recognizing the difficulty in effectuating any significant change in the Texas
death penalty, strive to make incremental limitations99 such as: prohibiting
a death sentence for offenders convicted of capital crimes under the law of
parties or offenders suffering from a mental illness at the time of the

96. Two Texas State Representatives, Harold Dutton, of District 142, and Jessica Farrar, of
District 148, seek to introduce abolishment legislation at every session. Andrew Schneider, Texas House
Committee Considers Bills to Abolish Death Penalty, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/2017/04/18/196638/texas-house-committeeconsiders-bills-to-abolish-death-penalty/ [perma.cc/QZ76-6YBW] (“Dutton has proposed a bill to
eliminate the death penalty in every legislative session since 2003. Farrar has offered one of her own
every two years since 2007.”). See generally Tex. H.B. 64, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (seeking to abolish the
death penalty, introduced by Representative Harold Dutton, left pending in committee since 2017).
See Tex. S.B. 597, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (seeking to make the maximum sentence for conviction of a
capital felony life imprisonment, introduced by Senator Eddie Lucio, left pending in committee since
2017); Tex. H.B. 1537, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (introducing legislation to end capital punishment,
introduced by Representative Jessica Farrar, left pending in committee since 2017); see also Press
Release, Tex. Coal. To Abolish the Death Penalty, Texas House Committee to Hear Death Penalty
Repeal Bill (Apr. 17, 2017) (on file with author) (announcing the Texas legislature’s holding of a public
hearing over a proposed bill to abolish the death penalty); Jolie McCullough, Five Death Penalty Reform
Bills Heard in Texas House Committee, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/
2017/04/18/multiple-death-penalty-reform-bills-heard-texas-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/6645MVX9] (highlighting death penalty legislation during the 2017 Texas legislative session).
97. See Tex. H.B. 1032, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015) (intending to advance legislation maximizing a
sentence for capital punishment at life or life without parole, introduced by Representative Harold
Dutton, left pending in committee since 2015); Tex. H.B. 1703, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013) (introducing
legislation to abolish capital punishment by Representative Jessica Farrar, left pending in committee
since 2013); Tex. H.B. 819, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011) (introducing legislation to abolish capital punishment
by Representative Jessica Farrar, left pending in committee since 2011).
98. See generally Jolie McCullough, Bill to Bar Death Penalty for Mentally Ill Faces Uphill Battle, TEX.
TRIB. (Mar. 8, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/03/08/texas-bill-wouldeliminate-death-penalty-mentally-ill/ [perma.cc/3FPS-NCKJ] (detailing Representative Toni Rose’s
efforts to limit the use of capital punishment on the mentally ill); Jolie McCullough, Texas Lawmakers
Aim to Eliminate Death Penalty for Convicts Who Didn’t Kill, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2017, 12:00 AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/02/01/texas-lawmakers-seek-reform-death-penalty-those-wh/
[perma.cc/YF7U-KPZW] [hereinafter McCullough, Texas Lawmakers Aim] (citing efforts by Texas
Representatives to limit use of capital punishment under the law of parties).
99. “‘We’ve got to start somewhere when it comes to reforming the death penalty, and there’s
no better place to start than the law of parties,’ said state Rep. Terry Canales . . . .” McCullough, Texas
Lawmakers Aim, supra note 98.
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crime.100 However, even seeking to enact any limitations is an arduous task
as Texas is unlikely to impose any restrictions on their use of the death
penalty until compelled to do so. In 2001, Texas lawmakers introduced a
bill seeking to prohibit the imposition of a death sentence upon an
intellectually disabled offender.101 The bill was passed by the House and
the Senate, only to be vetoed by Governor Rick Perry.102 The following
year, in Atkins, the Supreme Court categorically prohibited the execution of
intellectually disabled offenders nationwide.103 Thus, Texas was forced to
impose the limitation they sought to avoid by vetoing H.B. 236.
Establishing this legislative landscape is important to understand that the
Texas Legislature and judiciary are reluctant to impose any limitations on
their use of the death penalty unless federally mandated. Similarly, Texas is
unlikely to expound on any mandated limitations. In simpler terms, in
regard to the death penalty, Texas is likely to only enact the bare minimum
to comply with federal law. Therefore, in suggesting guidelines to the
legislature to replace the Briseno factors in light of Moore, the most effective
proposition is the bare minimum. The bare minimum would be
constitutional but also impose the fewest restrictions upon Texas. Drafting
a Moore-compliant statute begins with the Court’s criticisms of the Briseno
factors: failure to be informed of current medical standards, reliance on
outdated medical information, and deviation from accepted clinical
standards.104
B. A Proposed Method Should Employ the Use of Current Definitions
The first step in creating a Moore-compliant method is simple: use current,
medically-accepted definitions. The definition utilized by the CCA required
an offender to prove:
100. See Tex. H.B. 147, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (introducing legislation that would abolish the
death penalty for coconspirators convicted of capital crimes, introduced by Representative Harold
Dutton, currently pending in committee); Tex. H.B. 316, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017) (seeking to have capital
punishment abolished as to those convicted of capital crimes under the law of parties, introduced by
Representative Terry Canales, currently pending in committee); Tex. H.B. 3080, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017)
(introducing legislation to prohibit the use of capital punishment on offenders suffering from a serious
mental illness at the time of the crime).
101. See Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (proposing to prohibit imposition of a death
sentence on the intellectually disabled; vetoed by Governor).
102. Veto Message of Gov. Perry, Tex. H.B. 236, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001).
103. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“[D]eath is not a suitable punishment for
a mentally retarded criminal.”).
104. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1042–43 (2017).
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(1) he suffers from significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning,
generally shown by an intelligence quotient (IQ) of [seventy] or less; (2) his
significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning is accompanied by
related and significant limitations in adaptive functioning; and (3) the onset of
the above two characteristics occurred before the age of eighteen.105

This definition was based on a 1992 definition by the AAIDD.106
The definition of intellectual disability is dynamic—changing with
developments in research—and crafted by the two leading organizations in
diagnosing and treating mental illness, intellectual disability, and
developmental disorders: American Psychiatric Association and American
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities.107 Both
organizations utilize a three-prong definition: deficits in intellectual
functioning and adaptive behavior presented during an individual’s
developmental period, typically age eighteen.108
The first prong, limited intellectual functioning, is a measurement of one’s
mental abilities, such as “reasoning, problem solving, planning, abstract
thinking, judgment, learning from instruction and experience, and practical
understanding.”109 One way of measuring limitations in intellectual
functioning is an IQ score.110 Typically, a score between sixty-five and
seventy-five will be an indication of disability.111 However, the APA
advises, since an IQ score is merely an approximation, a professional
clinician is needed to interpret the score.112 The problem with using an IQ
score as an indication of intellectual disability arises when an individual’s

105. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039
(2017).
106. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1055.
107. See AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 1–2 (explaining the
interests of the AAIDD as “the nation’s oldest and largest organization of professionals in the field of
intellectual disability”); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 1–2 (detailing
the interest of the APA, “the world’s largest professional association of psychologists”).
108. See Definition of Intellectual Disability, supra note 65 (“This condition is one of several
developmental disabilities—that is, there is evidence of the disability during the developmental period,
which in the US is operationalized as before the age of [eighteen].”). But see DSM-5, supra note 65,
at 38 (“Criterion C, onset during the developmental period, refers to recognition that intellectual and
adaptive deficits are presented during childhood or adolescence.”).
109. DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37.
110. Definition of Intellectual Disability, supra note 65.
111. DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37.
112. Id.
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score is above seventy.113 Typically, an individual with an intellectual
disability will have an IQ score below seventy.114 However, some
individuals can have a score above seventy but still be diagnosed disabled
because more severe limitations in their adaptive behaviors could result in a
lower overall functioning than an individual with an IQ score below
seventy.115
This leads to the second prong, limitations in adaptive behavior, which is
“how well a person meets community standards of personal independence
and social responsibility, in comparison to others of similar age and
sociocultural background.”116 This prong encompasses three different
arenas of adaptive reasoning: “conceptual, social, and practical.”117
Conceptual reasoning is the academic arena and includes areas such as
“memory, language, reading, writing, [and] math reasoning.”118 The social
arena measures an individual’s “awareness of others’ thoughts, feelings, and
experiences” as wells as their own ability to communicate with others.119
The third arena encompassed by the second prong, an individual’s practical
adaptive reasoning, is measured by his ability to maintain a job, financial
responsibility, and his own self-care.120 The second prong of an intellectual
disability diagnosis will be satisfied when an individual is deficient in any one
of these three arenas.121
For a proper diagnosis under the APA standards, all three prongs must
be satisfied and “the deficits in adaptive functioning must be directly related
to the intellectual impairments” under the first prong.122 Therefore, the
113. James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues,
27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 13 (2003).
114. Id.
115. See DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37 (“[A] person with an IQ score above [seventy] may have
such severe adaptive behavior problems . . . that the person’s actual functioning is comparable to that
of individuals with a lower IQ score. Thus, clinical judgment is needed in interpreting the results of
IQ tests.”).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 38 (“Criterion B is met when at least one domain of adaptive functioning . . . is
sufficiently impaired that ongoing support is needed in order for the person to perform adequately in
one or more life settings at school, at work, at home, or in the community.”).
122. Id. The CCA refers to this as the “relatedness requirement.” See Ex parte Moore,
470 S.W.3d 481, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“In making a relatedness determination, the factfinder
may consider the seven evidentiary factors that we developed in Briseno . . . .”), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039
(2017).
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CCA reasoned the Briseno factors, although based on an outdated diagnostic
manual, were still “adequately ‘informed by the medical community’s
diagnostic framework.’”123 However, under the current standards
employed by the AAIDD, this relatedness is no longer required.124 In their
criticism of the CCA, the Court never explicitly instructs states to employ
the AAIDD standard in place of the APA standard and omit the
requirement of relatedness between the first and second prong. However,
the Court goes on to emphasize the absence of the relatedness requirement
from Texas statutes establishing standards for determining intellectual
disability in areas other than capital punishment.125 Therefore, in drafting
a Moore-compliant statute, the Texas Legislature should utilize this current
three-prong definition of intellectual disability without the relatedness
requirement.
C. A Proposed Method Should Rely on Current Diagnostic Standards Established
by Medical and Psychological Experts
In Atkins, the Supreme Court gave the states the authority to establish
their own method to enforce their rulings.126 Twelve years later, in Hall,
the Court narrowed the authority given to the states by holding that such
authority did not allow the states to disregard current medical standards.127
The Court’s criticism of the Briseno factors focused on multiple ways in
which the factors failed to follow current standards in diagnosing intellectual
disability.128 Therefore, in order to be Moore-compliant, a proposed method
should, at a minimum, utilize current diagnostic standards.

123. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 487 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 722–23 (2014)).
124. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1055 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“By the time Moore’s case reached
the CCA, the AAIDD no longer included the requirement that adaptive deficits be ‘related’ to
intellectual functioning.”).
125. See id. at 1052 (“[T]he relatedness requirement Texas defends here is conspicuously absent
from the standards the State uses to assess students for intellectual disabilities.” (citation omitted));
accord 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1040(c)(5) (providing guidelines for determining intellectual
disability of a student); 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 380.8751(e)(3) (outlining the standard for diagnosing
intellectual disability for juvenile offenders).
126. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).
127. Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 712, 723 (2014).
128. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053 (“By rejecting the habeas court’s application of medical
guidance and clinging to the standard it laid out in Briseno, including the wholly nonclinical Briseno
factors, the CCA failed adequately to inform itself of the ‘medical community’s diagnostic
framework[.]’” (quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 721 (2014))).
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1. Current Diagnostic Standards Require Equal Assessment
of All Three Prongs to Determine Intellectual Disability
As explained above, in Section B, individuals with an IQ score above
seventy can still be diagnosed intellectually disabled due to more severe
limitations in their adaptive functioning.129 This is the point where states
attempting to comply with Atkins have gone awry. A few states, including
Florida, refused to allow any evidence of limitations in adaptive behavior,
the second prong of the intellectual disability determination, if an individual
had an IQ score above seventy.130 The Supreme Court invalidated this
bright-line cut off because it considered an IQ score as conclusive evidence
of intellectual disability contrary to professional standards.131 Similarly, the
Supreme Court criticized Texas for failing to comply with Hall, and
proceeded to the second prong of diagnosis when Moore’s score was “close
to, but above, [seventy][.]”132 Factoring in the five points of standard
measurement error into Moore’s score of seventy-four produces a score
below seventy.133 Thus, because Moore’s IQ range was below seventy, the
CCA was required to proceed to the second prong and evaluate his adaptive
behavior.134
In order to comply with the current medical and professional standards,
the proposed Texas method should embody a more holistic approach by

129. See DSM-5, supra note 65, at 33 (“The various levels of severity are defined on the basis of
adaptive functioning, and not IQ scores, because it is adaptive functioning that determines the level of
supports required.”).
130. E.g., Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712, 714 (Fla. 2007) (construing section 921.137 of
the Florida Statute as establishing a bright-line cut off for intellectual disability at an IQ of seventy and
refusing to allow the defendant to present evidence of the second prong of the intellectual disability
determination because of an IQ score of seventy-two), abrogated by, Hall, 572 U.S. 701.
131. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 712 (“Florida’s rule disregards established medical practice . . . . It
takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts
in the field would consider other evidence.”).
132. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (“The CCA’s conclusion that Moore’s IQ scores established
that he is not intellectually disabled is irreconcilable with Hall. Hall instructs that, where an IQ score
is close to, but above, [seventy], courts must account for the test’s ‘standard error of measurement.’”
(quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 724)).
133. Id.; see also Leigh D. Hagan & Thomas J. Guilmette, The Death Penalty and Intellectual
Disability: Not So Simple, 23 CRIM. JUST. 21, 23 (2017) (explaining the standard error of measurement
generally accepted by psychologists is five IQ points).
134. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050 (“[I]n line with Hall, we require that courts continue the
inquiry and consider other evidence of intellectual disability where an individual’s IQ score, adjusted
for the test’s standard error, falls within the clinically established range for intellectual-functioning
deficits.”).
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evaluating all evidence of intellectual disability equally.135 Current
standards used by mental health professionals still use an IQ score, not as
conclusive proof of a disability or lack thereof, but as one of multiple factors
to consider when making a diagnosis.136 Therefore, a proposed method
should instruct trial courts to allow defendants making an Atkins claim to
present evidence of their IQ score and evidence of their adaptive behaviors
to be considered as a whole.137 Including such an instruction would ensure
the proposed method was informed by current mental health standards and
in compliance with Hall and Moore.138
2.

Current Diagnostic Standards for Adaptive Deficits

At his habeas hearing, Moore presented strong evidence of limitations in
his adaptive behaviors, such as inability to conform to social norms and low
levels of reading, writing, and mathematical skills.139 The habeas court
focused solely on the deficiencies in Moore’s adaptive behaviors and thus
found him to be intellectually disabled and exempt from execution.140 In
their denial of relief, the CCA faulted the habeas court for failing to also
consider Moore’s adaptive strengths.141 The CCA then proceeded to
catalog the “adaptive strengths” Moore had developed “by living on the
street, playing pool and mowing lawns for money” and through the
135. See APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 8 (“A comprehensive
assessment must be ‘based on multiple data points’ that ‘include giving equal consideration to
significant limitations in adaptive behavior and intellectual functioning.’” (quoting ROBERT L.
SCHALOCK ET AL., INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF
SUPPORTS 28 (11th ed. 2010))).
136. Id.
137. See id. (“The criteria to diagnose intellectual disability are not evaluated separately, in
disjunctive inquiries, but are rather considered together during a clinical evaluation by a mental health
professional.” (citing DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37)); see also Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 535 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015) (Alcala, J., dissenting) (declining to join the majority because their determination of
Moore not being intellectually disabled based solely on in IQ score was contrary to the holding in Hall),
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
138. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1049 (ruling the Texas method in violation of Hall for their view of
IQ score and for their failure to be aligned with current medical standards); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S.
701, 721 (2014) (holding a determination of intellectual disability must be “informed by the views of
medical experts” and courts may not consider an IQ score as conclusive evidence of intellectual
disability); see also DSM-5, supra note 65, at 37 (“The diagnosis of intellectual disability is based on both
clinical assessment and standardized testing of intellectual and adaptive function.”).
139. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 520, 522.
140. Id. at 484, 489.
141. See id. at 489 (“The habeas court therefore additionally erred to the extent that it . . .
considered only weaknesses in applicant’s functional abilities.”).
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knowledgeable way in which he committed the instant offense.142 The
CCA used Moore’s adaptive strengths to counteract his deficits and, as a
result, held he failed to prove “he [had] significant . . . limitations in adaptive
functioning.”143 The Supreme Court opined the CCA erred in considering
any adaptive strengths Moore had, especially those developed in prison.144
These considerations are contrary to current diagnostic standards.145
In diagnosing intellectual disability, mental health experts focus only on
an individual’s limitations in their adaptive behaviors— “things that an
individual cannot do in everyday life.”146 Similarly, current diagnostic
standards disregard any adaptive behaviors acquired while incarcerated.147
Those adaptive behaviors, because developed in such a controlled
environment, are not accurate assessments of the individual’s limitations in
everyday life.148
The CCA further deviated from current “clinical practice by requiring
Moore to show that his adaptive deficits were not related to ‘a personality
disorder.’”149 The CCA employed the Briseno factors to make the
“relatedness determination”—that the individual’s limitations in adaptive
behaviors was related to the first prong, their limited intellectual
functioning.150 Under this method, an individual failing to prove his
deficits in adaptive functioning were not related to another cause, like a
personality disorder, would not be considered intellectually disabled and
thus exempt from execution.151 Mental health experts condemn this
142. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1047 (citing Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 522–23).
143. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 520, 524–25.
144. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050.
145. See id. (“Moore’s adaptive strengths, in the CCA’s view, constituted evidence adequate to
overcome the considerable objective evidence of Moore’s adaptive deficits[.] But the medical
community focuses on the adaptive-functioning inquiry on adaptive deficits.” (citations omitted)).
146. AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 15; accord APA Amici
Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 13 (“[M]ental health professionals agree that
intellectual disability can and should be diagnosed where there are sufficient deficits in adaptive
functioning. That remains true even if the individual has relative strengths in other areas.”).
147. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1050 (“Clinicians, however, caution against reliance on adaptive
strengths developed ‘in a controlled setting,’ as prison surely is.” (quoting DSM-5, supra note 65, at 38).
148. See AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 16 n.17 (“Clinicians
agree that prison behavior is not a valid measure of an individual’s real-life functioning.”).
149. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (2017) (quoting Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 488 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015) , vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017)).
150. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 489.
151. See id. at 488 (“[I]t is not sufficient for an applicant to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that he has significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning and significant limitations
in adaptive functioning. An applicant must also demonstrate . . . that his adaptive behavior deficits are
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relatedness requirement based on a longstanding understanding that
individuals diagnosed with intellectual disability are likely to also be afflicted
with other physical or mental conditions.152 Therefore, the presence of any
other cause or disorder should not preclude a finding of intellectual
disability.153
Based on the above criticisms and accepted standards, a proposed Texas
method should include the following instructions for trial courts assessing
the second prong of intellectual disability: (1) the fact-finder should only
consider an individual’s limitations in adaptive functioning, no consideration
of adaptive skills should be made; (2) the fact-finder should consider only
adaptive deficits developed outside of a controlled environment; and (3) the
fact-finder should not require the individual to prove his adaptive deficits
are not related to any other co-occurring disorder.154 Including these
instructions ensures compliance with Moore and accepted standards

related to significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning rather than some other cause.”
(citations omitted) (citing Ex parte Hearn, 310 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010))); see also Ex
parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151, 163–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (denying applicant’s claim of intellectual
disability because he failed to prove his limitations in adaptive functioning were related to impaired
intellectual ability and not to other causes, like poverty).
152. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (“As mental-health professionals recognize, however, many
intellectually disabled people also have other mental or physical impairments . . . .” (citing DSM-5, supra
note 65, at 40)); see also AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 20 (“Many
individuals who have intellectual disability also have other mental or physical disabilities. Co-existing
conditions . . . can arise in the evaluation process in some Atkins cases. This phenomenon has long
been recognized by clinicians and mental health professionals.”); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 72, at 19 (“[P]ersons with intellectual disability are three to four times more likely
to have co-occurring mental disorders—with personality disorders being one type of many such
disorders—than the general population.” (citing DSM-5, supra note 65, at 40)).
153. See AAIDD Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 22 (“The fact that
an individual who has intellectual disability also has another mental condition or mental illness does
not alter the diagnostic process.”); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 19
(“The existence of a personality disorder or other mental health issue is emphatically not evidence that
a person does not also have an intellectual disability.” (citing Jannelien Weiland et al., The Prevalence of
Personality Disorders in Psychiatric Outpatients with Borderline Intellectual Functioning: Comparison with Outpatients
from Regular Mental Health Care and Outpatients with Mild Intellectual Disabilities, 69 NORDIC J. PSYCHIATRY
599, 602 (2015); NATIONAL ASS’N FOR THE DUALLY DIAGNOSED, DIAGNOSTIC MANUAL—
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A TEXTBOOK OF DIAGNOSIS OF MENTAL DISORDERS IN PERSONS
WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 248–49 (Robert J. Fletcher et al. eds., 2007); Lambert v. State,
126 P.3d 646, 655 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005))).
154. This third instruction would be unnecessary if the proposed method included the currently
accepted definition of intellectual disability as suggested in Part III, Section B, which does away with
the relatedness requirement.
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employed by the AAIDD and the APA.155
D. A Proposed Method Should Include Only Definitions and Standards Utilized by
Professionals and Exclude Any Stereotypes Associated with Intellectual Disability
In order for intellectually disabled offenders to be exempt from execution
in Texas, the Briseno court required those offenders to meet the standards
that the majority of its citizens would consider to be disabled.156
Consideration of these nonprofessional opinions resulted in the Briseno
factors including stereotypes of the intellectually disabled.157 Texas’s
inclusion of stereotypes has received criticism from both the Supreme Court
and mental health experts.158 Inclusion of subjective, non-medical factors
could lead to the execution of an individual with an intellectual disability.159
Therefore, a proposed method should avoid including any considerations
or opinions of stereotypes or non-professionals when making a
determination of intellectual disability.160 The suggestions to a proposed
method included above strictly follow current diagnostic standards. Thus,
following the suggestions would ensure a new method would exclude any
stereotypes.

155. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052–53 (abrogating Texas’s Briseno factors for multiple reasons,
including their failure to follow diagnostic standards utilized by mental health professionals); AAIDD
Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 19–20, 28 (presenting to the Supreme Court
the current, clinically accepted standards in diagnosing intellectual disability and addressing the ways in
which the Texas method deviates from those standards); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting
Petitioner, supra note 72, at 16–17 (detailing to the Supreme Court the ways in which the Briseno factors
fail to be informed by experts or have any basis in science or medicine).
156. Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogated by Moore, 137 S. Ct.
1039.
157. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051; see Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8 (providing all seven, nonclinical
factors, the first being: “Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage—his
family, friends, teachers, employers, authorities—think he was mentally retarded at that time, and, if
so, act in accordance with that determination?”).
158. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051–52 (explaining the risk of execution presented to mildly
intellectually disabled offenders by the subjectivity of the Briseno factors); APA Amici Curiae Brief
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 16–17 (“[T]he factors Texas allows factfinders to use to
determine eligibility for relief under Atkins distort the assessment of adaptive functioning by . . . relying
on stereotypes of intellectual disability . . . .”).
159. APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 17, 26.
160. Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d 481, 539–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Alcala, J., dissenting),
vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72, at 26.
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E. When Formulating a Proposed Method, Mental Health Professionals
Should Be Consulted
The suggestions provided above are the bare minimum which would
ensure a new method is in compliance with Atkins, Hall, and Moore.161 As
explained, the most vital aspect of crafting a new method to determine
intellectual disability is ensuring it is aligned with current diagnostic
standards utilized by mental health professionals.162 The Briseno factors
were judge-made law, formulated by the judges at the CCA, who are experts
in law but not necessarily experts in diagnosing intellectual disability.163
Lawmakers have greater access to those experts through advisory
committees and advocacy groups comprised of professionals in the field
providing the most up-to-date information.164 Therefore, the Texas
Legislature is better positioned to create new law to replace the Briseno
factors. In order to ensure a new method is in compliance with the most
current standards, the Texas Legislature should utilize these resources when
formulating a new method for courts to follow when determining
exemption from capital punishment.

161. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1044 (abrogating the Briseno factors and outlining the ways in which
they are unconstitutional); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 722–23 (2014) (rejecting a bright-line IQ cutoff
method and requiring the states’ methods to be informed by currently accepted medical standards);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317, 321 (2002) (prohibiting the execution of all intellectually disabled
persons but leaving to the states to determine which offenders qualify).
162. See Petetan v. State, No. AP-77,038, 2017 WL 915530, at *50 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 8,
2017) (Alcala, J., dissenting) (detailing why a new Texas method should be based on current diagnostic
standards in order to comply with Hall v. Florida); Ex parte Moore, 470 S.W.3d at 531–34 (explaining
why, based on precedence, “[t]he Supreme Court [r]equires a [c]ourt to [c]onsider [c]urrent [m]edical
[s]tandards in [e]valuating [w]hether the [e]vidence [e]stablishes the [t]here-[p]ronged [g]eneral
[s]tandard for [i]ntellectual [d]isability”); APA Amici Curiae Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 72,
at 26 (imploring the Supreme Court to strike down the Briseno factors for failing to align with current
diagnostic standards).
163. See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1054 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“[C]linicians, not judges, should
determine clinical standards; and judges, not clinicians, should determine the content of the Eighth
Amendment.”).
164. See Intellectual and Developmental Disability System Redesign Advisory Committee,
TEX. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://hhs.texas.gov/about-hhs/leadership/advisory-comm
ittees/intellectual-developmental-disability-system-redesign-advisory-committee [perma.cc/2UDAHBSN] (providing information on a committee which advises governmental agencies on the support
needed by the intellectually disabled to effectively implement a new senate bill); Mission, History, and
Achievements, ARC TEX., https://www.thearcoftexas.org/who-we-are/ [perma.cc/E7WQ-NLU9]
(detailing the goals and achievements the advocacy group has had for the intellectually disabled through
the Texas Legislature).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Since its statehood, the death penalty has had deep roots in Texas, causing
it to be the deadliest state in the Union.165 The strong support capital
punishment finds in Texas makes abolishment unlikely, unless federally
mandated. However, in recent years, Texas has been forced to narrow their
scope of capital punishment as a result of limitations imposed by the
Supreme Court, including exclusion of the intellectually disabled. Through
their prohibition, the Supreme Court left to the states the authority to
develop their own methods for determining intellectually disability without
providing any guidance to ensure the developed methods were
constitutional. As a result, the states developed a myriad of methods, some
of which were later declared unconstitutional, including Texas’s. The
Supreme Court’s opinion in Moore v. Texas was a call to the Texas Legislature
to formulate a new, constitutional method. In their formulation of a new
method to determine intellectual disability, the Texas Legislature should
consider the following suggestions: utilize current definitions, rely on
current diagnostic standards, including equally considering evidence of all
three prongs, focus only on adaptive deficits developed outside of a
controlled environment, and not requiring the deficits be independent of
any other disorders. By following these suggestions, the Texas Legislature
can ensure their method will comply with Moore, Hall, and Atkins.

165. Facts About the Death Penalty, supra note 5.
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